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Predetermined? The Prospect of Social
Determinant-Based Section 1115
Waivers After Stewart v. Azar
Griffin Schoenbaum*
ABSTRACT
Section 1115 of the Social Security Act allows the Secretary
of Health and Human Services (the “Secretary”) to waive some
of Medicaid’s requirements so states can enact “demonstration
projects.”  A demonstration project is an experiment a state can
conduct by modifying aspects of its Medicaid program.  To waive
Medicaid’s requirements for this purpose, the Secretary must de-
termine that the proposed demonstration project will likely assist
in promoting Medicaid’s objectives.
Using this standard, President Trump’s Secretary has ap-
proved waiver requests to enact demonstration projects that con-
tain “community engagement” requirements.  The U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia has heard each challenge to
the Secretary’s approval of these waiver requests.  In each case,
the court found that the proposed demonstration project was un-
likely to assist in promoting Medicaid’s objectives—due in large
part to the community engagement requirements.
Throughout these cases, the Secretary argued that commu-
nity engagement would likely make beneficiaries healthier.  But
the court responded that improving beneficiaries’ health is not a
Medicaid objective and is thus an improper basis upon which to
approve a waiver request.  Another theme in these cases was the
court’s mantra that Medicaid’s chief objective is to finance recipi-
ents’ care.  Yet, to complicate matters, a different line of cases
identifies Medicaid’s chief objective as not only financing recipi-
ents’ care but also ensuring its provision.  If these are the objec-
tives that a demonstration project must likely promote, many
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demonstration projects intended to improve health may not sur-
vive judicial scrutiny.
This Comment discusses the leading community engagement
requirement case, Stewart v. Azar.  It does so with an eye toward
the consequences that Stewart may have for social determinant of
health-based demonstration projects.  This Comment argues the
courts should allow the Secretary to approve at least some of
these projects, despite the roadblocks that Stewart appears to
present.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“[A]s it relates to our health, our zip code may be more impor-
tant than our genetic code,” wrote James S. Marks, the Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation’s former Executive Vice President.1  In-
deed, the quality of our nutrition,2 education,3 housing,4  and many
other socioeconomic resources greatly influences our health.5  The
health care literature refers to these health-affecting socioeconomic
resources as the social determinants of health (“SDHs”).6  Low-in-
come populations often lack high-quality socioeconomic resources,
and their health suffers accordingly.7  As a medical assistance pro-
1. James S. Marks, Why Your Zip Code May Be More Important to Your
Health Than Your Genetic Code, HUFFPOST, http://bit.ly/2V2pLAO [https://perma
.cc/XGA6-BLZZ] (last updated May 25, 2011).
2. See, e.g., Stefanie Winston Rinehart et al., Building a Connection Between
Senior Hunger and Health Outcomes, 116 J. ACAD. NUTRITION & DIETETICS 759,
759 (2016) (citations omitted) (“Malnourished patients have worse health out-
comes when compared with well-nourished patients, including increased physician
visits, longer hospital stays and readmissions, decreased function and quality of
life, and increased health care costs.”).
3. See, e.g., Emily B. Zimmerman et al., Understanding the Relationship Be-
tween Education and Health: A Review of the Evidence and an Examination of
Community Perspectives, in POPULATION HEALTH: BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCI-
ENCE INSIGHTS 347, 348 (Robert M. Kaplan et al. eds., 2015), http://bit.ly/2tmIVFs
[https://perma.cc/ANW6-Z72N] (“Of the various social determinants of health that
explain health disparities by geography or demographic characteristics (e.g., age,
gender, race-ethnicity), the literature has always pointed prominently to
education.”).
4. See, e.g., Michael Weitzman et al., Housing and Child Health, 43 CURRENT
PROBS. PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 187, 187 (2013) (citation omit-
ted) (“The connection between housing and health is well established.”).
5. See generally Social Determinants of Health, HEALTHY PEOPLE 2020, http://
bit.ly/2S5hjyO [https://perma.cc/42KF-MELG] (last visited Nov. 20, 2019) (provid-
ing an overview of the social determinants of health); Samantha Artiga & Eliza-
beth Hinton, Beyond Health Care: The Role of Social Determinants in Promoting
Health and Health Equity, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 10, 2018), http://bit.ly/
2pkbqoN [https://perma.cc/9FFG-ZC4V] (same).
6. See sources cited supra note 5.
7. See STEVEN H. WOOLF ET AL., URBAN INST., & CTR. ON SOC’Y & HEALTH,
HOW ARE INCOME AND WEALTH LINKED TO HEALTH AND LONGEVITY? 6 (2015),
https://urbn.is/2BNoKWb [https://perma.cc/W6LH-PCFC].
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\124-2\DIK207.txt unknown Seq: 4 29-JAN-20 9:52
536 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:533
gram for low-income populations, Medicaid appears to be the per-
fect vehicle to address this issue.8  But a new line of cases may stand
in the way.9
These cases involve Section 1115 of the Social Security Act.10
This section allows the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services (the “Secretary”) to waive some of Medicaid’s
requirements so states can experiment with their Medicaid pro-
grams.11  President Trump’s Secretary has used this waiver author-
ity to approve states’ requests to run demonstration projects that
include community engagement requirements.12  Kentucky’s was
the first of these requests that the Secretary approved, and Ken-
tucky Medicaid recipients immediately challenged the Secretary’s
approval.13
Part II of this Comment describes Medicaid’s origins, develop-
ment, and operation.14  Part II then discusses Section 1115 waivers
and how they can address the SDHs.15  Next, Part II summarizes
the litigation surrounding the Secretary’s approval of Kentucky’s
waiver request and notes a lingering definitional question.16  Part
III theorizes that the litigation could hinder the future of SDH-
based demonstration projects.17  Part III then argues that, though
things look grim, courts should still permit the Secretary to approve
at least some SDH-based demonstration projects.18
8. See infra Section II.A.
9. See infra Part III.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2018).  This Comment follows the administrative and
scholarly practice of referring to these waivers by their Social Security Act desig-
nation (Section 1115), not their United States Code designation (§ 1315(a)). See,
e.g., Sidney D. Watson, Premiums and Section 1115 Waivers: What Cost Medicaid
Expansion?, 9 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 265, 265 (2016); About Section
1115 Demonstrations, MEDICAID.GOV, http://bit.ly/2SC8phr [https://perma.cc/
UK58-7XHK] (last visited Nov. 20, 2019).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2018); see also infra Section II.B.
12. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
13. Benjy Sarlin, First-in-Nation Medicaid Work Requirements Approved for
Kentucky, NBC NEWS, https://nbcnews.to/2SHmnhZ [https://perma.cc/NZX6-
XV6T] (last updated Jan. 12, 2018, 4:06 PM); see also infra Section II.C.
14. See infra Section II.A.
15. See infra Section II.B.
16. See infra Section II.C.
17. See infra Section III.A.
18. See infra Section III.B.




1. The Social Security Act: Social Insurance and Welfare
Assistance Programs
Medicaid19 is one of several programs housed within the Social
Security Act.20  The Social Security Act’s programs fit into two
broad categories:  (1) social insurance programs and (2) welfare as-
sistance programs.21  Medicaid belongs in the second category; un-
derstanding why can shed light on the program itself.22
Social insurance programs spread the financial risk associated
with uncertainties like death, illness, and unemployment.23  The
programs distribute benefits only to those who contribute to
them24—regardless of their wealth or income.25  The Social Security
Act’s social insurance programs include Federal Old Age, Survi-
vors, and Disability Insurance26 and Medicare.27
By contrast, welfare assistance programs distribute benefits
based on need.28  For this reason, welfare assistance programs be-
long in the “residual welfare” tradition.29  Programs in this tradition
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396w-5 (2018).
20. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301–1397mm (2018)).  The Social Security Act is Title 42,
Chapter 7 of the United States Code; the Act’s programs comprise the various
subchapters within Chapter 7. Id.
21. ANDREW W. DOBELSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT:
THE FOUNDATION OF SOCIAL WELFARE FOR AMERICA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 15 (2009); Elva Marquard, Social Insurance and Public Assistance Pay-
ments, 6 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 16, 16 (1944), http://bit.ly/2VXEhLM [https://perma
.cc/F6G7-M68L] (discussing the Social Security Act’s programs in terms of “insur-
ance and assistance programs”).
22. See infra Section II.A.2.
23. About the National Academy of Social Insurance, NAT’L ACAD. OF SOC.
INS., http://bit.ly/2yRgIcV [https://perma.cc/6H52-CZRD] (last visited Nov. 20,
2019); Historical Background and Development of Social Security, SOC. SEC. AD-
MIN., http://bit.ly/2V0wafw [https://perma.cc/K3AX-5G38] (last visited Nov. 20,
2019) [hereinafter Historical Background].
24. Social Insurance Programs, INST. FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY, UNIV. OF
WISCONSIN-MADISON, http://bit.ly/2YWn9G1 [https://perma.cc/UNQ6-JSPJ] (last
visited Nov. 20, 2019).
25. DOBELSTEIN, supra note 21, at 20 (“Eligibility to the social insurance pro-
grams is an entitlement to those people (and their family members) who contrib-
uted to the program as defined in the law, regardless of economic need.”).
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–434 (2018) (Title II of the Social Security Act).
27. Id. §§ 1395–1395lll (Title XVIII of the Social Security Act).
28. Marquard, supra note 21, at 17; see also DOBELSTEIN, supra note 21, at 20;
id. at 131 (“[Welfare assistance] requires highly discretionary decisions about those
who seek relief and how much relief they need.”).
29. See Ira Colby, Chapter 1 Social Welfare Policy as a Form of Social Justice,
in SOCIAL WORK AND SOCIAL POLICY: ADVANCING THE PRINCIPLES OF ECO-
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require individuals to exhaust their private resources before receiv-
ing public assistance.30  The Social Security Act’s welfare assistance
programs include Supplemental Security Income31 and Medicaid.32
2. A Brief History of Medicaid
a. Welfare Assistance Before the Social Security Act
The residual welfare tradition long predates the Social Security
Act and its welfare assistance programs.33  In fact, some scholars
trace the tradition to medieval Europe’s ecclesiastical poor relief.34
But the Elizabethan Poor Laws serve as an acceptable starting
point, as scholars consistently cite these laws as having directly in-
fluenced colonial American welfare assistance.35
NOMIC AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 1, 10 (Ira C. Colby et al. eds., 2013) (“Residual welfare
. . . only includes public assistance or policies related to the poor.  Residual services
carry a stigma; are time-limited, means-tested, and emergency-based; and are gen-
erally provided when all other forms of assistance are unavailable.  Welfare ser-
vices come into play only when all other systems have broken down or proven to
be inadequate.”).
30. Colby, supra note 29, at 10; see also DOBELSTEIN, supra note 21, at 20.
Dobelstein writes:
Assistance programs satisfy “residual” social welfare issues by providing
money for those who are unable to maintain sufficient income or gain
access to necessary services using their own financial resources. . . .  Be-
cause people are expected to take care of themselves or the family or
friends are expected to help out in times of need, when these options are
not available, then welfare is given in the form of assistance, “residual
welfare.”
Id.
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381–1385 (2018) (Title XVI of the Social Security Act).
32. Id. §§ 1396–1396w-5 (Title XIX of the Social Security Act).
33. See DOBELSTEIN, supra note 21, at 20 (“Residual welfare is the oldest of
all welfare ideas.”).
34. See, e.g., TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT? THE THREATS
FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE
67 (2003) (noting that the Elizabethan Poor Laws, which would go on to influence
American welfare assistance, evolved from 14th century laws that targeted people
in poverty); Larry Cata´ Backer, Medieval Poor Law in Twentieth Century America:
Looking Back Towards a General Theory of Modern American Poor Relief, 44
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 871, 938–53 (1995) (recounting “the development of Anglo-
American [assistance] systems from their origins in the medieval system of ecclesi-
astical relief to their modern manifestation as state general assistance systems”).
35. See, e.g., Bruce Jansson, Chapter 2 Reconceptualizing the Evolution of the
American Welfare State, in SOCIAL WORK AND SOCIAL POLICY: ADVANCING THE
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 21, 28–29 (Ira C. Colby et al. eds.,
2013); Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 439
(2011); Philip Harvey, Joblessness and the Law Before the New Deal, 6 GEO. J.
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 18 (1999); Backer, supra note 34, at 964–65; Historical
Background, supra note 23.
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The Elizabethan Poor Laws emerged in England between 1597
and 1601.36  Making a moral distinction “between the ‘deserving’
and the ‘undeserving’ poor,”37 they obligated local churches to as-
sist the vulnerable and punished the “paupers who were capable of
working.”38  The Elizabethan Poor Laws greatly influenced the
American colonies.39  Each colony enacted laws that were nearly
identical40—both in their welfare aims and moral overtones.41  And
even as welfare assistance evolved throughout early American his-
tory,42 it retained the stigma it inherited.43
Welfare assistance also remained an entirely local enterprise.44
Despite activists’ efforts to secure federal involvement, local wel-
fare administration prevailed throughout the 19th century.45  But
the 19th century also ushered in the Industrial Revolution, which
spawned new demands for welfare assistance as people flooded cit-
ies and life expectancy increased.46
The early 20th century saw a pair of tangible advances in wel-
fare assistance.47  Social reformers pushed President Theodore
Roosevelt to create the White House Conference on Children,
which produced the Children’s Bureau in 1912.48  Reformers also
influenced President Harding to sign legislation49 in 1921 that allo-
36. JOST, supra note 34, at 67; Harvey, supra note 35, at 18.
37. Historical Background, supra note 23.
38. JOST, supra note 34, at 67.
39. See sources cited supra note 35.
40. Harvey, supra note 35, at 21.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 21–22 (identifying several forms of early American welfare
assistance).
43. See Historical Background, supra note 23 (“Those receiving relief could
lose their personal property, the right to vote, the right to move, and in some cases
were required to wear a large ‘P’ on their clothing to announce their status.”).
44. Harvey, supra note 35, at 30–31 (describing local control over who could
receive welfare assistance and how much they could receive with little state over-
sight); DOBELSTEIN, supra note 21, at 133 (“Pre-Social Security Act welfare was
locally provided . . . .”).
45. See, e.g., DOBELSTEIN, supra note 21, at 1–2.  One such activist was Doro-
thea Dix, a social reformer motivated by the deplorable condition of mental health
treatment in America. Id. at 1.  Dix persuaded several state legislatures to create
hospitals for people with mental illnesses. Id. Next, Dix petitioned Congress to
approve federal land grants to states, allowing them to build additional hospitals.
Id. at 1–2.  Congress drafted and presented legislation to President Franklin Pierce.
Id.  But President Pierce vetoed the legislation:  “[I]n summary, Pierce said welfare
is not the responsibility of the federal government.” Id. at 2.
46. See Historical Background, supra note 23.
47. See DOBELSTEIN, supra note 21, at 2–3.
48. Id. at 2.
49. Sheppard-Towner Maternity and Infancy Act, ch. 135, Pub. L. No. 67-97,
42 Stat. 224 (repealed 1929).
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cated federal funds to various maternal- and children’s-health-re-
lated programs.50
Then, in October of 1929, the New York Stock Exchange
crashed:  The Great Depression had begun.51  At that time, local
governments provided the majority of welfare assistance, with pri-
vate entities providing the rest.52  But the Great Depression’s im-
mensity53 soon required the federal government’s involvement in
welfare assistance matters.54
b. From the Social Security Act to Medicaid’s Enactment
The Social Security Act of 1935 marked a critical turn in wel-
fare legislation.55  Though the Act’s social insurance program may
be the most notable of the original programs,56 the Act also created
several welfare assistance programs.57  Yet the Act in its original
form left gaping holes through which sizable groups of needy peo-
ple fell,58 provoking calls for amendment.59
Though Congress has amended the Social Security Act many
times, the Social Security Amendments of 196560 have emerged as
perhaps the most significant amendments.61  The 1965 amendment
50. DOBELSTEIN, supra note 21, at 2–3.
51. ROBERT F. HIMMELBERG, THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE NEW DEAL
4 (2001).
52. DOBELSTEIN, supra note 21, at 28.
53. See Donald M. Fisk, American Labor in the 20th Century, COMPENSATION
& WORKING CONDITIONS (Fall 2001), at 2, http://bit.ly/2S4npPV [https://perma.cc/
3MJ9-HE8B] (“In 1933, there were more than 12 million workers unemployed;
and the unemployment rate averaged 24.9 percent.”).
54. DOBELSTEIN, supra note 21, at 28 (noting that appeals for federal involve-
ment escalated as the unemployment rate increased).
55. Historical Background, supra note 23.
56. See id. (“It was Title II that was the new social insurance program we now
think of as Social Security.”).
57. DOBELSTEIN, supra note 21, at 132 (identifying these original welfare as-
sistance programs as Aid to the Aged (Title I), Aid to the Blind (Title X), and Aid
to Dependent Children (Title IV)).
58. See Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability in
the Social Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REV. 361, 410 (1996) (noting the limited
assistance that the 1935 Act afforded people with disabilities).
59. See DOBELSTEIN, supra note 21, at 144 (“[P]ressure to expand Title II So-
cial Security continued until Disability Insurance was finally established as part of
Title II in 1956.”).
60. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286
(codified as amended primarily in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.) (creating
Medicare and Medicaid).
61. See DOBELSTEIN, supra note 21, at 219 (“Next to the creation of the Social
Security Act itself, the 1965 Amendments to the Social Security Act constitute a
lasting social welfare landmark.”).
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added both Title XVIII (Medicare Parts A and B)62 and Title XIX
(Medicaid).63  Medicare and Medicaid both address access to health
care, but they do so very differently:  Medicare functions as a social
insurance program, and Medicaid functions as a welfare assistance
program.64
c. From Medicaid’s Enactment to the Present
Since Medicaid’s enactment, Congress has made important
amendments to the program’s benefits and eligibility require-
ments.65  Just two years after Medicaid’s enactment, for example,
Congress added the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic and
Treatment (“EPSDT”) benefit for enrollees under age 21.66  And in
1989, Congress expanded Medicaid eligibility to all pregnant
women and all dependent children in families with incomes below
133 percent of the Federal Poverty Line.67
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)68 ex-
panded Medicaid eligibility even further.69  As enacted, the ACA
required every state to begin covering nearly all non-elderly adults
whose incomes fell below 133 percent70 of the Federal Poverty Line
62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395–1395lll (2018).
63. Id. §§ 1396–1396w-5.
64. See DOBELSEIN, supra note 21, at 255 (“[T]he 1965 amendments contin-
ued the tradition of creating two fundamentally different kinds of social welfare
programs, social insurance and assistance, with the same purpose in mind: health
care.”); Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Healthcare
for?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1693, 1712 (2018) (“[T]he distinction between social insur-
ance and welfare that was encoded in the first Social Security Act was carried
through into the statutory principles that underlie the differences between Medi-
care and Medicaid.”).
65. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 627 (2012) (GINS-
BURG, J., dissenting) (“Since 1965, Congress has amended the Medicaid program
on more than 50 occasions, sometimes quite sizably.”); Federal Legislative Mile-
stones in Medicaid and CHIP, MACPAC, http://bit.ly/2X1ppMu [https://perma.cc/
YF93-PJ6U] (last visited Nov. 20, 2019) (listing and describing the major federal
legislation affecting Medicaid).
66. Social Security Act Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r) (2018)).
67. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6401,
103 Stat. 2106, 2258.
68. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended primarily in scattered sections of 26 and 42
U.S.C.).
69. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 542 (explaining that “[t]he Afforda-
ble Care Act expands the scope of the Medicaid program and increases the num-
ber of individuals the States must cover”).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2018).  Though the ACA set “the
eligibility threshold for Medicaid at 133 percent of the [Federal Poverty Line], . . .
[5] percent of [Medicaid] applicants’ income is disregarded, raising the effective
threshold to 138 percent of the [Federal Poverty Line].” Estimates for the Insur-
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on January 1, 2014.71  But the Supreme Court forestalled the ACA’s
mandatory Medicaid expansion in the 2012 case National Federa-
tion of Independent Business v. Sebelius.72  In that case, the Court
held that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion must be optional for each
state.73  Still, the ACA has succeeded in transforming American
health care74 and continues to set the terms of national health care
debates.75
3. Medicaid’s Operation
The federal Medicaid statute (the “Medicaid Act”) defines
Medicaid’s basic framework.76  The Medicaid Act requires each
participating77 state to annually submit a state plan78 to the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”).79  A state plan
ance Coverage Provisions of the Affordable Care Act Updated for the Recent Su-
preme Court Decision, CONG. BUDGET OFF. 7 n.13 (2012), http://bit.ly/2Eb9MuC
[https://perma.cc/2T9F-KHBR].
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2018); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep.
Bus., 567 U.S. at 576.
72. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
73. Id.  As of November 15, 2019, 37 states (including the District of Colum-
bia) have chosen to expand their Medicaid coverage in accordance with the ACA’s
standard. Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 15, 2019), http://bit.ly/2tkbELk [https://perma.cc/6UDA-
APV9].
74. See Summary of the Affordable Care Act, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 25,
2013), http://bit.ly/2Ece30H [https://perma.cc/5NXK-U27F] (summarizing a num-
ber of the ACA’s major changes to various sectors of American health care).
75. See, e.g., Rakesh Singh & Craig Palosky, Poll: Most Democrats Prefer a
Presidential Candidate Who Wants to Build on the Affordable Care Act, KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 12, 2019), http://bit.ly/2lQMzap [https://perma.cc/98M4-
7GU8] (discussing data from a poll that asked Democrats and Democratic-leaning
independents whether they support presidential candidates who would build on
the ACA or seek to replace it).
76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396w-5 (2018).
77. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980) (“Although participation in the
Medicaid program is entirely optional, once a [s]tate elects to participate, it must
comply with the requirements of Title XIX.”).  Each state and the District of Co-
lumbia participate in Medicaid. See Program History, MEDICAID.GOV, http://bit.ly/
2BEwbyH [https://perma.cc/7QS8-453E] (last visited Nov. 20, 2019).
78. 42 C.F.R. § 430.10 (2019) (“The [s]tate plan is a comprehensive written
statement submitted by the [state] agency describing the nature and scope of its
Medicaid program and giving assurance that it will be administered in conformity
with the specific requirements of title XIX, the regulations in . . . Chapter IV [of
Title 42], and other applicable official issuances of [the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services].  The State plan contains all information necessary for CMS
to determine whether the plan can be approved to serve as a basis for Federal
financial participation (FFP) in the State program.”).
79. Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 730 F.3d 291, 297 (3d Cir. 2013) (“CMS is the division of HHS [the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services] tasked with ensuring that state plans
comply with those and other requirements of the Medicaid Act.”).
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shows how the state intends to observe the Medicaid Act’s require-
ments and specifies any optional eligibility or benefit allowances
the state intends to provide.80  CMS reviews each state plan and
approves those that comply with the Medicaid Act.81  After approv-
ing a state plan, CMS disburses funds to the state according to its
“federal medical assistance percentage.”82  The state then carries
out its plan subject to CMS’s oversight.83
States have significant freedom to customize their state plans.84
Each state can adjust eligibility requirements, decide which op-
tional benefits to cover, and experiment with systems of provider
payment and health care delivery.85  A state can also amend its
state plan after CMS has approved it.86  But perhaps the broadest
grant of authority to change a state’s Medicaid program lies in Sec-
tion 1115 of the Social Security Act.87
B. Section 1115 Waivers and the Social Determinants of Health
1. Section 1115 Waivers
Section 1115 of the Social Security Act allows the Secretary—
CMS in practice88—to waive some of Medicaid’s89 provisions so
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2018); Nazareth Hosp. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 747 F.3d 172, 175 (3d Cir. 2014); 42 C.F.R. § 430.10 (2019).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b) (2018); 42 C.F.R. § 430.14 (2019).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2018); see also id. § 1396d(b) (outlining the process by
which each state’s federal medical assistance percentage is calculated).  The “fed-
eral medical assistance percentage” is an annual calculation of the federal govern-
ment’s share of Medicaid funds disbursed to each state. Id. § 1396b.  The
calculation is different for each state because it is based on each state’s per capita
income relative to the national average. See id.
83. Id. § 1396c.
84. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 686 (2003)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Congress has afforded States broad flexibility in tai-
loring the scope and coverage of their Medicaid programs . . . .”); Samantha Artiga
et al., Current Flexibility in Medicaid: An Overview of Federal Standards and State
Options, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 31, 2017), http://bit.ly/2DHkSpC [https://per
ma.cc/YR68-57V6] (“Each state Medicaid program is unique, reflecting states’ use
of existing program flexibility and waiver authority to design their programs to
meet their specific needs and priorities.”).
85. Artiga et al., supra note 84.
86. Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 730 F.3d 291, 297 (3d Cir. 2013) (“A state may . . . amend an approved
[Medicaid] plan, but any amendments must also be submitted to CMS, and the
agency must ‘determine whether the [amended] plan continues to meet the re-
quirements for approval.’” (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c)(2)(i))).
87. See NAT’L ASS’N OF MEDICAID DIRS., MEDICAID SECTION 1115 WAIVER
TRENDS IN AN ERA OF STATE FLEXIBILITY 1 (2018), http://bit.ly/2tlTKI9 [https://
perma.cc/E6VP-N7SH].
88. See Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 245 (D.D.C. 2018) (emphasis
added) (“[D]uring the 50-plus years of Medicaid, CMS has not previously ap-
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states can enact “demonstration projects.”90  States have enacted
demonstration projects to test methods of prescription drug fund-
ing, address substance use disorders, and provide integrative care
for beneficiaries also enrolled in Medicare.91  By unhampering
states from some of Medicaid’s statutory requirements, Section
1115 encourages innovation in Medicaid.92
The Secretary enjoys substantial93 waiver authority under Sec-
tion 1115 but does not have carte blanche.94  Section 1115 provides
that the Secretary may approve a waiver request only to enact an
“experimental, pilot, or demonstration project.”95  The Secretary
must determine that the project “is likely to assist in promoting the
objectives of” Medicaid.96  Even then, the Secretary can only waive
Medicaid’s requirements “to the extent and for the period . . . nec-
essary to enable [the s]tate . . . to carry out such project.”97  And the
Secretary must consider the “costs of such project . . . expenditures
under the [s]tate plan.”98  Lastly, CMS has issued guidance requir-
proved a community-engagement or work requirement as a condition of Medicaid
eligibility.”); 42 C.F.R. § 431.416 (2019) (providing that CMS is responsible for
approving Section 1115 waiver requests).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(1) (2018) (providing that the Secretary can waive the
Medicaid requirements housed in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a).  Section 1115 does not limit
the Secretary’s waiver authority to Medicaid. Id.  In fact, Congress added Section
1115 to the Social Security Act three years before it added Medicaid. See Public
Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 122, 76 Stat. 172, 192.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2018).  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has defined a
“demonstration project” as follows:
[A] plan for which some of the regulations imposed on Medicaid plans
under subchapter XIX are waived in order to “enable the states to try
new or different approaches to the efficient and cost-effective delivery of
health care services, or to adapt their programs to the special needs of
particular areas or groups of recipients.”
Cookeville Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Leavitt, 531 F.3d 844, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting
42 C.F.R. § 430.25); see also About Section 1115 Demonstrations, supra note 10.
91. NAT’L ASS’N OF MEDICAID DIRS., supra note 87, at 2–3, 5.
92. See S. REP. NO. 87-1589, at 19–20 (1962) (describing Section 1115 waivers
as a means of removing statutory constraints, thus allowing states to experiment
with the ways in which they address public welfare concerns).
93. Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1069 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that “the Secre-
tary has considerable discretion” in approving Section 1115 waivers).
94. C.K. v. N.J. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171, 187 (3d Cir.
1996) (“We are well aware of our proper deference to the Secretary with regard to
the issuance of [Section 1115] waivers.  However, that deference is not absolute.”).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2018).
96. Id.
97. Id. § (a)(1).
98. Id. § (a)(2)(A).
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ing the Secretary to ensure that a proposed project is budget neu-
tral to the federal government.99
Judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act100 can
further constrain the Secretary’s discretion.101  A court may reverse
the Secretary’s approval of a Section 1115 waiver request if it
deems the approval “arbitrary and capricious.”102  This standard of
review requires a court to examine the administrative record that
the Secretary considered.103  The court may vacate and remand the
Secretary’s approval if it deems the approval unreasonable in light
of the administrative record and Section 1115’s requirements.104
Before a state can request a Section 1115 waiver, it must re-
ceive public input on its proposed demonstration project by pub-
licizing and holding a notice and comment period.105  The state
must also hold at least two public hearings.106  It may then submit
its waiver request to CMS.107  If CMS deems the state’s request sat-
isfactory, CMS solicits further public comments on the demonstra-
tion project.108  CMS must publish, review, and consider the public
99. See Letter from Timothy B. Hill, Acting Dir., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medi-
caid Servs., to State Medicaid Directors 1 (Aug. 22, 2018), http://bit.ly/2Rj8lPG
[https://perma.cc/5QV6-MUF6] (“Currently, CMS will not approve a demonstra-
tion project under section 1115(a) of the Act unless the project is expected to be
budget neutral to the federal government.  A budget neutral demonstration pro-
ject does not result in Medicaid costs to the federal government that are greater
than what the federal government’s Medicaid costs would likely have been absent
the demonstration.”).
100. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2018).
101. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2018) (providing a presumption that agency ac-
tions are subject to judicial review).  For a more comprehensive discussion, see
generally EDWARD C. LIU & JENNIFER A. STAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., JU-
DICIAL REVIEW OF MEDICAID WORK REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 1115 DEM-
ONSTRATIONS (Mar. 28, 2017), http://bit.ly/2krOaCY [https://perma.cc/U2FA-
3WXT] (discussing judicial review of Section 1115 waivers).
102. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (requiring courts to “hold unlawful and set
aside agency action” that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law”); Newton-Nations v. Betlach, 660 F.3d 370, 378
(9th Cir. 2011) (“We may reverse an agency action only if it is contrary to law or
‘arbitrary and capricious’ in that: ‘The agency has relied on factors which Congress
has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of
the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evi-
dence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.’” (quoting Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 44 (1983))).
103. C.K. v. N.J. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171, 182 (3d Cir.
1996).
104. See C.K., 92 F.3d at 182 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 420 (1971)).
105. 42 C.F.R. § 431.408(a)(1)–(2) (2019).
106. Id. § 431.408(a)(3).
107. Id. § 431.412(b).
108. Id. § 431.416(b).
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comments it receives.109  Only then may CMS issue its final deci-
sion.110  After approving a waiver request, CMS monitors the im-
plemented demonstration project for compliance with the terms
and conditions of the approval.111
2. Using Section 1115 Waivers to Address the Social
Determinants of Health
States have used Section 1115 waivers to address the SDHs,112
albeit indirectly.113  The SDHs are socioeconomic factors that affect
people’s health outcomes.114  Recognizing the benefits of address-
ing health-harming SDHs, Rhode Island and Massachusetts have
requested and received waivers to create Accountable Care Organi-
zations (“ACO”).115  These ACOs screen Medicaid recipients for
health-harming social needs, including housing, nutrition, and utili-
ties issues.116  The ACOs then refer the recipients to social service
organizations within their networks.117
Many ideas for SDH-based demonstration projects have so far
remained untested, such as using Medicaid funding to create legal
services organizations.118  Access to legal services is an SDH,119 as
litigation and legal counseling can help people access health-bene-
109. Id. § 431.416(d).
110. Id. § 431.416(e).
111. Id. § 431.420.
112. DIANA CRUMLEY ET AL., CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES, AD-
DRESSING SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH VIA MEDICAID MANAGED CARE
CONTRACTS AND SECTION 1115 DEMONSTRATIONS 8–11 (2018), http://bit.ly/
2GNPqcn [https://perma.cc/WUM3-WM8F].
113. ELIZABETH HINTON ET AL., SECTION 1115 MEDICAID DEMONSTRATION
WAIVERS: THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF APPROVED AND PENDING WAIVERS,
KAISER FAM. FOUND. 11 n.27 (2019), http://bit.ly/2kKacRP [https://perma.cc/5S7R-
C22R].  “Medicaid funds typically cannot be used to pay directly for non-medical
interventions that target the social determinants of health.” Id. at 5.
114. See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text.
115. CRUMLEY ET AL., supra note 112, at 25–27.  For more information on
ACOs, see Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs): General Information, CTRS.
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://bit.ly/2X8Pg5l [https://perma.cc/
6MFE-CNAC] (last updated Nov. 27, 2019).
116. See CRUMLEY ET AL., supra note 112, at 25–27.
117. See id.
118. See Cerin M. Lindgrensavage, Model Fairness and Advocacy for Inter-
ested Recipients (FAIR) Act, 2014 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y QUORUM 76,
80–81 (2014).
119. See Wendy E. Parmet et al., Social Determinants, Health Disparities and
the Role of Law, in POVERTY, HEALTH AND LAW: READINGS AND CASES FOR
MEDICAL-LEGAL PARTNERSHIP 3, 25 (Elizabeth Tobin Tyler et al. eds., 2011)
(“Lawyers and advocates can use a variety of techniques, including client educa-
tion, advocacy with government officials, negotiation and even litigation to alter
the social conditions faced by specific individual . . . clients, thereby improving
their health.”).
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fiting socioeconomic resources, including medical care.120  Though
no state has implemented a legal services demonstration project,
this fact alone does not render such projects impossible.  Indeed,
the Trump administration’s endorsement of community engage-
ment waiver requests is an entirely new phenomenon.121
Before President Trump’s election, CMS was unwilling to ap-
prove Section 1115 waivers that would impose community engage-
ment requirements on Medicaid recipients.122  CMS changed
direction on January 11, 2018, when then-CMS director Brian Neale
sent a letter to the state governors suggesting that they experiment
with “work and community engagement” Medicaid require-
ments.123  In his letter, Neale identified work and community en-
gagement as “health determinants” that “may improve health
outcomes.”124  He wrote that, like education, work and community
engagement can contribute to people’s health and well-being.125
As of November 11, 2019, 18 states have submitted waiver re-
quests to implement projects with community engagement require-
ments, and the Secretary has approved 9 states’ requests.126  The
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia has reviewed each
120. See id.; infra Section III.B.2.
121. See Letter from Brian Neale, Dir., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to State Medicaid Dirs. 1 (Jan. 11, 2018) [herein-
after Neale Letter], http://bit.ly/2SATRyr [https://perma.cc/4YAB-D68F] (“CMS
will support state efforts to test incentives that make participation in work or other
community engagement a requirement for continued Medicaid eligibility or cover-
age for certain adult Medicaid beneficiaries in demonstration projects authorized
under section 1115 of the Social Security Act . . . .”).
122. Fiscal Year 2017 HHS Budget: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health
of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. 35 (2016) (statement of
Sec’y Burwell), http://bit.ly/2X3t64a [https://perma.cc/Z9EC-M5W7] (“[D]emon-
stration projects [must] promote the objectives of the Medicaid and CHIP pro-
grams.  However, requiring Medicaid beneficiaries to work or receive job training
is not an objective of Title XIX.”).
123. Neale Letter, supra note 121, at 1.
124. Id. at 2.
125. Id.
126. Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Approved and Pending Section 1115 Waivers
by State, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 11, 2019), http://bit.ly/2X6Y77E [https://per
ma.cc/K5AJ-RTEJ].
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challenge to the Secretary’s approval of these waiver requests.127
And in each case, the court vacated the Secretary’s approval.128
C. Stewart v. Azar and the Definitions of “Medical Assistance”
1. Background
In January 2014, Kentucky’s then-Governor Steve Beshear ex-
panded Kentucky’s Medicaid eligibility in line with the ACA’s di-
rective.129  The next year, Kentucky elected a new Governor, Matt
Bevin, who promised to roll back the Medicaid expansion.130  Gov-
ernor Bevin’s weapon of choice was a comprehensive Section 1115
waiver request to include community engagement requirements in
Kentucky’s Medicaid program.131  Governor Bevin requested the
waiver on August 24, 2016.132  When the Trump administration took
over in 2017, then-Secretary Tom Price and current CMS Adminis-
trator Seema Verma signaled their willingness to approve commu-
nity engagement requirements under Section 1115.133  A few
127. See generally Philbrick v. Azar, No. 19-773, 2019 WL 3414376 (D.D.C.
July 29, 2019); Gresham v. Azar, 363 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.D.C. 2019); Stewart v.
Azar, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125 (D.D.C. 2019); Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237
(D.D.C. 2018).  On September 23, 2019, Indiana Medicaid recipients sued in the
same court to challenge the Secretary’s approval of Indiana’s community engage-
ment waiver request.  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 46, Rose
v. Azar, No. 1:19-cv-02848 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2019).  The D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals will soon become the second court to review the Secretary’s approval of a
community engagement waiver request. See James Romoser, Federal Appeals
Court Appears Dubious of Medicaid Work Requirements, INSIDE HEALTH POLICY
(Oct. 11, 2019), https://bit.ly/35zcPaV [https://perma.cc/B9F3-6XTD] (noting that
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals heard consolidated oral arguments in Stewart
and Gresham on October 11, 2019).
128. Philbrick, 2019 WL 3414376, at *52; Stewart, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 156; Stew-
art, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 274; see Gresham, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 182.  This Comment
clearly focuses on Stewart; discussing Gresham and Philbrick would be superfluous
because the court’s reasoning in those cases was nearly identical to its reasoning in
Stewart. See Philbrick, 2019 WL 3414376, at *2–3; Gresham, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 169
(discussing similarities with Stewart).
129. Joseph A. Benitez et al., Kentucky’s Medicaid Expansion Showing Early
Promise on Coverage and Access to Care, 35 HEALTH AFFAIRS 528, 528 (2016),
http://bit.ly/2SZiTGK [https://perma.cc/77LD-4RFR].
130. See Proposed Changes to Medicaid Expansion in Kentucky, KAISER FAM.
FOUND (Aug. 4, 2017), http://bit.ly/2V1B4Jd [https://perma.cc/US3T-9K8A].
131. Id.
132. See generally Letter from Matthew G. Bevin, Governor, Ky., to Sylvia
Burwell, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Aug. 24, 2016), http://bit.ly/
2nLnezq [https://perma.cc/7NQ4-LR5J] (attaching Kentucky’s Section 1115 waiver
request).
133. Letter from Thomas E. Price, Sec’y, Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., & Seema Verma, Admin., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to
the U.S. Governors 2 (Mar. 14, 2017), http://bit.ly/2SDEK7g [https://perma.cc/
Z3ZV-UB9N].
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months later, Governor Bevin submitted a modified Section 1115
waiver request to CMS.134  On January 12, 2018, CMS for the first
time approved a Section 1115 waiver request to include community
engagement requirements in a Medicaid program.135
2. Stewart v. Azar: The First Community Engagement
Requirement Case
On January 24, 2018, Kentucky Medicaid recipients challenged
the Secretary’s approval of their state’s Section 1115 waiver request
(“Stewart I”).136  They specifically challenged the Secretary’s ap-
proval of “Kentucky HEALTH,” a suite of requirements137 within
the more general demonstration project that Kentucky sought to
implement.138  So Kentucky HEALTH served as the operative
demonstration project for purposes of the court’s review.139
The court framed the primary issue as “whether the Secretary
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in concluding that Kentucky
HEALTH was ‘likely to assist in promoting the objectives’ of the
Medicaid Act.”140  Though the parties disagreed about Medicaid’s
objectives,141 the court found enough overlap between their posi-
134. See generally Letter from Matthew G. Bevin, Governor, Ky., to Brian
Neale, Dir., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs. (July 3, 2017), http://bit.ly/2nPJ7h9 [https://perma.cc/R2TL-EDQ5] (attach-
ing modifications to Section 1115 waiver request).
135. See generally Letter from Brian Neale, Dir., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medi-
caid Servs., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Adam Meier, Deputy Chief of
Staff, Office of Governor Matthew Bevin (Jan. 12, 2018), http://bit.ly/2nO373D
[https://perma.cc/P7KK-5Q9H] (approving Kentucky’s modified Section 1115
waiver request and attaching Special Terms and Conditions).
136. See generally Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Re-
lief, Stewart v. Hargan, 313 F. Supp 3d 237, No. 1:18-cv-152 (D.D.C. Jan 24, 2018)
(outlining the bases for plaintiffs’ challenge).
137. Stewart, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 246–47 (D.D.C. 2018) (noting that Ken-
tucky HEALTH includes (1) a community-engagement requirement, (2) limits on
retroactive eligibility, (3) monthly premiums, (4) limits on non-emergency medical
transportation, (5) reporting requirements, and (6) lockouts).
138. See id. at 257–59 (defining the scope of the plaintiffs’ challenge).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 259 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)).  The Secretary initially con-
tended that his approval of Kentucky’s waiver request was not subject to judicial
review. Id. at 254.  But the court noted that the Administrative Procedure Act
only precludes judicial review of agency actions when the statute underlying the
agency action lacks adjudicative standards.  See id. Here, the court found that Sec-
tion 1115 of the Social Security Act provides the necessary adjudicative standards.
Id.
141. Compare Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment at 16, Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 1:18-cv-
152) (“[T]he purpose of the [Medicaid] Act is to enable states to furnish medical,
rehabilitative, and other health care services.”), with Memorandum in Support of
Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judg-
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tions and the case law to locate Medicaid’s objectives in the Medi-
caid Act’s appropriations provision.142  From this provision, the
court extracted “two related objectives: allowing states, ‘as far as
practicable,’ to ‘furnish (1) medical assistance’ and (2) ‘rehabilita-
tion and other services’ designed to ‘help individuals retain a capac-
ity for independence.’”143  The court focused its analysis almost
exclusively on the first objective:  furnishing medical assistance.144
To define “medical assistance,” the court imported a definition
from an opinion the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued in
2008.145  The Stewart I court thus stated that “[t]he Medicaid statute
‘defines “medical assistance” as “payment of part or all of the cost”
of medical “care and services” for a defined set of individuals.’”146
In other words, to provide Medicaid recipients with “medical assis-
tance” is to finance their health care.147  Reviewing the administra-
tive record, the court found that the Secretary had considered
neither the estimated 95,000 Kentuckians who would lose their cov-
erage nor whether Kentucky HEALTH would help promote cover-
age.148  Because the Secretary had overlooked Medicaid’s central
objective—health insurance coverage—the court concluded that
the Secretary’s approval was arbitrary and capricious.149  Accord-
ingly, the court vacated and remanded the Secretary’s approval.150
3. The Stewart I Court’s Treatment of Improved Health
Outcomes as a Medicaid Objective
The Secretary argued that Medicaid’s fundamental objective is
to improve recipients’ health outcomes and that Kentucky
ment, and in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 20,
Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d. 237 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 1:18-cv-152) (“The Act’s
overarching purpose, of course, is to promote public health and well-being.”).
142. Stewart, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237 at 260.
143. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1).
144. Compare id. at 243–44, 260–61, 263, 265–66, 268–72 (making about 25
references to furnishing or providing medical assistance as being Medicaid’s inten-
tion, objective, purpose, or goal), with id. at 260, 266, 271 (making about five refer-
ences to furnishing rehabilitation and other services); see also Stewart v. Azar, 366
F. Supp. 3d 125, 155 (calling “the furnishing of medical assistance” the Medicaid
Act’s “prime objective”).
145. Stewart, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 260 (quoting Adena Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Leav-
itt, 527 F.3d 176, 180, (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a))).
146. Id.
147. See id. at 260–61 (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 262–65.
149. Id. at 259–60, 265.
150. Id. at 274.
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HEALTH was likely to assist in furthering that objective.151  After
all, Kentucky HEALTH requires community engagement, and, ac-
cording to the Secretary, community engagement improves people’s
health and well-being.152  The court avoided this empirical question
and instead attacked the Secretary’s fundamental premise—that
Congress intended Medicaid to improve recipients’ health.153  In-
deed, the court had already established that Medicaid’s aim is not
to advance recipient’s health outcomes but to finance recipient’s
health care.154
To illustrate the difference, the court offered the following
hypothetical:
[I]magine two Kentuckians, Joe and Dan.  Both are diagnosed
with Hodgkin’s Lymphoma.  Joe has health insurance and is able
to receive treatment for a co-pay of $100.  Dan has no health
insurance.  He, too, is able to receive treatment, but he must pay
out of pocket for the treatment costing tens of thousands of dol-
lars.  To do this, he and his wife must sell the family ranch, which
had been in Dan’s family for over four generations.  After 18
months, both Joe and Dan are cancer free; in other words, they
are equally healthy.  But Dan, unlike Joe, is in financial ruin.155
According to the court, Congress intended Medicaid to pre-
vent situations like Dan’s; whether Medicaid would also make re-
cipients healthier was an afterthought.156  Indeed, had Congress
wanted Medicaid to directly improve recipients’ health, it could
have required recipients to exercise or eat nutritious food.157  But
Congress did no such thing, so the court concluded that Medicaid’s
overarching concern is to furnish “medical assistance,” which the
court defined as financing recipients’ health care.158
151. Id. at 266; see also Sidney D. Watson, Medicaid, Work, and the Courts:
Reigning in HHS Overreach, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 887, 889 (2018) (“Seema
Verma and other Trump Administration officials at HHS have taken the position
that the ultimate purpose of Medicaid is to promote health and wellbeing.”).
152. See Stewart, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 266.
153. See id. at 266–68.
154. Id. at 266 (“[The Secretary’s] focus on health is no substitute for consid-
ering Medicaid’s central concern: covering health costs.”).
155. Id. at 267.
156. Id. at 266–67.
157. Id. at 268 (“Either of those conditions could promote ‘health’ or ‘well-
being’ . . . but both are far afield of the basic purpose of Medicaid: ‘reimburs[ing]
certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons.’” (quoting Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980)).
158. Id. at 266–67.
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4. Subsequent Developments
On November 20, 2018, the Secretary re-approved Kentucky’s
remanded waiver request.159  Kentucky Medicaid recipients sued
two months later, bringing the parties back to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia (“Stewart II”).160  Relevant to
this Comment, the Secretary continued to argue that Kentucky
HEALTH would likely assist in furthering Medicaid’s objectives
because it would improve recipients’ health.161  The court did not
budge on this point.162  The Secretary’s non-health-related argu-
ments fared no better with the court.163  It once again vacated and
remanded the Secretary’s approval of Kentucky HEALTH.164  But
rather than review Kentucky’s waiver request once more, the Secre-
tary filed a Notice of Appeal.165
5. The Definitions of “Medical Assistance”
As noted above, the Stewart I court defined “medical assis-
tance” in purely financial terms.166  It drew its definition from
Adena Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Leavitt,167 a case the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals decided in 2008.168  The Adena court, in turn, drew its defi-
nition of “medical assistance” from 42 U.S.C § 1396d(a),169 which in
2008 defined “medical assistance” as “payment of part or all of the
cost of . . . care and services.”170
In 2009, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce rec-
ognized a circuit split over the meaning of “medical assistance”
159. See generally Letter from Paul Mango, Chief Principal Deputy Adm’r,
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Carol
H. Steckel, Comm’r, Dept. for Medicaid Servs., Commonwealth of Ky. (Nov. 20,
2018), http://bit.ly/2SCmRpp [https://perma.cc/6BTU-Z9R2] (reapproving Ken-
tucky’s waiver request and attaching Special Terms and Conditions).
160. First Amended Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief, Stewart v. Azar, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, No. 1:18-cv-152 (D.D.C. Jan. 14,
2019).
161. Stewart v. Azar, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 143–44 (D.D.C. 2019).
162. Stewart, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 143–45.
163. See id. at 145–55 (rejecting the Secretary’s financial independence and
fiscal sustainability arguments).
164. Id. at 156.
165. Notice of Appeal, Stewart v. Azar, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, No. 1:18-cv-152
(D.D.C. Apr. 10, 2019).  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments
on October 11, 2019.  Romoser, supra note 127.  As this Comment goes to print,
the court’s opinion is still forthcoming.
166. Supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
167. Adena Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Leavitt, 527 F.3d 176 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
168. Supra notes 145–46 and accompanying text.
169. Adena, 527 F.3d at 180.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2006 & Supp. I 2008).
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within the Medicaid Act.171  Some circuits interpreted “medical as-
sistance” to mean that states only had to finance recipients’ medical
care.172  But the First Circuit Court of Appeals read “medical assis-
tance” to imply that states must provide recipients’ care.173  Other
circuits merely identified the definitional disagreement.174
Congress officially amended the Medicaid Act’s definition of
“medical assistance” when it passed the ACA,175 which President
Obama signed into law in 2010.176  The amended definition embod-
ied the House Committee on Energy and Commerce’s declaration
that “medical assistance” means both financing and providing recip-
ients’ health care.177  Congress’s amendment had a clear impact on
some courts, which applied the post-ACA definition of medical as-
171. H.R. REP. NO. 299, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. 2009, at 649–50 (Oct. 14, 2009).
The House Committee on Energy and Commerce wrote:
[Medical assistance] is expressly defined to refer to payment but has gen-
erally been understood to refer to both the funds provided to pay for care
and services and to the care and services themselves.  The Committee,
which has legislative jurisdiction over Title XIX of the Social Security
Act, has always understood the term to have this combined meaning.
Four decades of regulations and guidance from the program’s administer-
ing agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, have pre-
sumed such an understanding and the Congress has never given contrary
indications. . . .  The Circuit Courts are split on this issue and the Supreme
Court has declined to review the question.  To correct any misunder-
standings as to the meaning of the term, and to avoid additional litigation,
the bill would revise section 1905(a) . . . to conform this definition to the
longstanding administrative use and understanding of the term.
Id.
172. Michael C. Danna, Medicaid Reform, Prison Healthcare, and the Due
Process Right to a Fair Hearing, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 429, 451–52
(2016) (describing a circuit split over the definition of “medical assistance” and
Congress’s effort to address it).  As Danna points out, the definition of “medical
assistance” is significant because “the term ‘medical assistance’ is used over 225
times in [42 U.S.C.] § 1396a,” which is the section that governs states’ Medicaid
plans. Id. at 451.
173. See id.
174. Id. at 452.
175. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2304,
124 Stat. 296 (2010) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)).  For purposes of Medicaid,
“[m]edical assistance” now means “payment of part or all of the cost of the follow-
ing care and services or the care and services themselves, or both.”  42 U.S.C.
§ 1396d(a) (2018).
176. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul
Bill, with a Flourish, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2010), https://nyti.ms/2MwMXW8
[https://perma.cc/8ZF5-SCKB].
177. Supra note 171; accord NICOLE HUBERFELD ET AL., THE LAW OF AMERI-
CAN HEALTH CARE 90 (2d ed. 2018) (“‘Medical assistance’ indicates Medicaid is
more than just money. . . .  Congress intended that participating states would be
responsible for providing specified medical services to beneficiaries; in other
words, states cannot agree to pay for care with Medicaid funds without ensuring
beneficiaries receive promised care.”).
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sistance.178  Other courts, however, continued to apply the pre-
ACA definition of medical assistance179—including the Stewart I
court.180  Whether a court selects the pre-ACA or post-ACA defini-
tion of “medical assistance” should determine what the administra-
tive record must show for the Secretary’s approval to withstand
arbitrary and capricious review.181
III. ANALYSIS
A. Stewart’s Implications for Social Determinant of Health-
Based Demonstration Projects
The way the court treated community engagement require-
ments in Stewart I and Stewart II offers a preview of how courts
could treat other SDH-based demonstration projects approved
under Section 1115.182  The Secretary consistently pitched commu-
nity engagement as an SDH, and the court addressed it as such.183
Hence, as Professor David A. Super has warned, it may turn out
that community engagement requirements and other SDH-based
pursuits have a “rise together, fall together” relationship:
A wide range of factors—from safe housing to good nutrition to
education—have been found to improve health outcomes.  If the
current [community engagement] waivers pass muster, no princi-
pled basis would exist to stop future administrations from al-
lowing states to expand food assistance or housing programs with
Medicaid funds under section 1115.184
178. See, e.g., Jefferson Cmty. Health Care Ctrs., Inc. v. Jefferson Parish
Gov’t, 849 F.3d 615, 625 (5th Cir. 2017); O.B. v. Norwood, 838 F.3d 837, 843 (7th
Cir. 2016); Dunakin v. Quigley, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1321 (W.D. Wash. 2015).
179. See, e.g., Phoenix Mem’l Hosp. v. Sebelius, 622 F.3d 1219, 1226 (9th Cir.
2010); Covenant Health Sys. v. Sebelius, 820 F. Supp. 2d 4, 9 (D.D.C. 2011).
180. See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.  Yet the Stewart I court
did acknowledge the amended definition upon Kentucky’s prompting. See Stewart
v. Azar, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 144–45 (D.D.C. 2019).  Kentucky averred that im-
proving beneficiaries’ health became a Medicaid objective when Congress broad-
ened definition of “medical assistance” to include ensuring the provision of care.
Id. at 144.  By contrast, this Comment understands the broadened definition as
effectively raising the bar that the Secretary must meet to properly approve a
waiver request. See infra Part III.  The Stewart I court did not address this poten-
tial implication. See Stewart, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 144–45.
181. Infra Part III.
182. See David A. Super, A Hiatus in Soft-Power Administrative Law: The
Case of Medicaid Eligibility Waivers, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1590, 1607 (2018) (noting
that states could enact a variety of SDH-based demonstration projects under Sec-
tion 1115 if community engagement requirements survive judicial review).
183. See Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 266–68 (D.D.C. 2018); supra
Section II.C.3.
184. Super, supra note 182, at 1607.
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This Comment’s concern is the inverse of Professor Super’s; hope-
fully, diagnosing the pitfalls of community engagement waiver re-
quests can help the Secretary shepherd other SDH-based projects
through judicial review.185
Recall that courts subject the Secretary’s approval of Medicaid
waiver requests to arbitrary and capricious review.186  Under this
standard of review, courts ask whether the administrative record
shows that the Secretary considered, among other things, whether
the proposed demonstration project is likely to assist in furthering
Medicaid’s objectives.187  Courts must identify Medicaid’s objec-
tives to make this determination.188  According to the court in Stew-
art I and Stewart II, Medicaid’s essential objective is furnishing
medical assistance.189
The next question is what “medical assistance” means.190  As
discussed above, courts can answer this question in two ways.191
Courts might define “medical assistance” as financing recipients’
medical care (the “pre-ACA definition”).192  Or courts might define
“medical assistance” to mean both financing and ensuring the pro-
vision of recipients’ care (the “post-ACA definition”).193
Courts that apply the pre-ACA definition should ask whether
the Secretary reasonably determined that a proposed demonstra-
tion project will likely assist in financing Medicaid recipients’
care.194  Courts that apply the post-ACA definition should also ask
whether the Secretary reasonably determined that the proposed
project will likely assist in ensuring that recipients receive their
care.195  In this way, the definition of “medical assistance” that a
court adopts should set the standard to which it holds the Secretary
under arbitrary and capricious review.
185. Cf. id.
186. Supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text.
187. Supra note 140 and accompanying text.
188. Stewart, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 259–60 (“begin[ning] with the basic ‘objec-
tives’ of Medicaid” after discussing arbitrary and capricious review).
189. Stewart v. Azar, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 155 (D.D.C. 2019) (calling “the
furnishing of medical assistance” the “prime objective of the [Medicaid] Act”); see
Stewart, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 272 (concluding that the Secretary’s approval was arbi-
trary and capricious for failing to address whether the Kentucky’s proposed dem-
onstration project would help furnish medical assistance).
190. Stewart, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 260 (“So what does ‘furnish[ing] . . . medical
assistance’ mean?”).
191. Supra Section II.C.5.
192. See supra notes 167–70 and accompanying text.
193. Supra notes 175–77 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 186–89, 192 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 186–89, 193 and accompanying text.
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B. How Social Determinant of Health-Based Demonstration
Projects Can Survive Arbitrary and Capricious Review
Stewart I and Stewart II contain ominous language about the
future of SDH-based demonstration projects.196  Indeed, in each
case the court emphasized that improving health outcomes is not a
Medicaid objective.197  But the lesson from those cases is not that
all SDH-based demonstration projects must fail.  Rather, the lesson
is that the Secretary cannot tout a demonstration project’s health-
improving features without reckoning with the project’s implica-
tions for furnishing medical assistance.198
But suppose the Secretary had reviewed Kentucky HEALTH
and reasonably concluded that no Kentuckians stood to lose cover-
age.  Would health-improvement then constitute a justifiable basis
upon which to approve an SDH-based demonstration project?
Those facts were not before the court.199  So Stewart I and Stewart
II offer no guidance as to whether an SDH-based demonstration
project must help furnish “medical assistance” or simply refrain
from significantly hindering that goal.  In any case, there are some
potential SDH-based demonstration projects that could improve
health and, as a happy consequence, help furnish “medical assis-
tance”—under the pre- or post-ACA definition.200  The following
illustrations give a sense of what such demonstration projects might
look like.
1. The Pre-ACA Definition of “Medical Assistance”
A state may propose a demonstration project to run a nutri-
tion-intervention program at in-state hospitals.201  Hospital workers
could screen at-risk Medicaid recipients for nutritional deficiencies
and then, when necessary, intervene with nutritional supple-
196. See Stewart v. Azar, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 145 (D.D.C. 2019) (“[T]he
Court finds that health is not a freestanding objective of the [Medicaid] statute, . . .
[and] if that is so, the Secretary’s consideration of it cannot support his [Section
1115] analysis.”); Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 266–68 (D.D.C. 2018)
197. See, e.g., Stewart, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 145; Stewart 313 F. Supp. 3d at
266–68.
198. Stewart, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 145.
199. See id. at 140 (noting that, in theory, a demonstration project may be
lawful even if it results in some coverage loss, but Kentucky HEALTH would re-
sult in “significant coverage loss”).
200. Infra Sections III.B.1–2.
201. See Suela Sulo et al., Budget Impact of a Comprehensive Nutrition-Fo-
cused Quality Improvement Program for Malnourished Hospitalized Patients, 10
AM. HEALTH & DRUG BENEFITS 262, 262 (2017).
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ments.202  The patients could also have the benefit of support staff
both at the hospital and after discharge to teach them about their
nutritional supplements.203
As described, this demonstration project’s objective is solely
focused on addressing patients’ health outcomes.204  But the project
could also furnish “medical assistance” under the pre-ACA defini-
tion; that is, it could help finance the cost of recipients’ care.205  In
fact, this illustration is based on a nutrition program that produced
millions of dollars in savings.206  States that run such nutrition pro-
grams could funnel their savings back into their Medicaid programs
to help finance recipients’ care—subject to applicable CMS rules.207
Courts applying the pre-ACA definition of “medical assistance”
should allow the Secretary to approve programs that can improve
recipients’ health outcomes while helping finance recipients’ care.
2. The Post-ACA Definition of “Medical Assistance”
A state may propose a demonstration project to create a legal
services organization to help Medicaid beneficiaries secure their
benefits.  The Pennsylvania Health Law Project (“PHLP”) is illus-
trative.208  PHLP is a non-profit, non-government-affiliated organi-
zation that provides low-income Pennsylvanians with health care-
related advice and advocacy.209  PHLP challenges Pennsylvanians’
denial and termination from public health insurance programs like
Medicaid.210  It also litigates to help Pennsylvanians receive the
care that Medicaid makes available to them.211
202. Id. at 263 (“[T]he quality improvement program include[s] malnutrition
risk screening at admission, prompt initiation of oral nutritional supplementation
for at-risk patients, and nutrition support and education for patients during the




206. Id. (noting that “reduced 30-day readmissions and hospital stay[s] associ-
ated with nutrition intervention” produced these savings).
207. See generally Letter from Timothy B. Hill, supra note 99 (outlining
CMS’s budget neutrality policies for demonstration projects enacted under Section
1115).  A state interested in running the proposed nutrition project would likely
request waiver under Section 1115(a)(2), but that analysis is beyond the scope of
this Comment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(2) (2018).
208. PA. HEALTH L. PROJECT, http://bit.ly/2Igi6gr [https://perma.cc/R4GA-
59TL] (last visited Nov. 20, 2019).
209. See About Us, PA. HEALTH L. PROJECT, http://bit.ly/2EcgccL [https://per
ma.cc/EL34-SYJW] (last visited Nov. 20, 2019).
210. See id.
211. See id.
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Because PHLP contests denials of Medicaid eligibility and cov-
ered Medical services, the organization is likely to assist in helping
recipients receive their care.212  PHLP also engages in education
and outreach, advising potential Medicaid recipients of their rights
and encouraging recipients to advocate for themselves, which may
help beneficiaries receive covered services.213  Also, like the nutri-
tion program noted above, a legal services demonstration project
can produce Medicaid savings to help cover the cost of recipients’
care.214  Courts applying the post-ACA definition of “medical assis-
tance” should allow the Secretary to approve programs like PHLP.
Such programs not only promote improved health outcomes for
beneficiaries but are also likely to help beneficiaries receive their
care.215
IV. CONCLUSION
Section 1115 waivers provide states with a great source of flexi-
bility in shaping their Medicaid programs.  But courts may prevent
the Secretary from allowing states to address the SDHs in their
Medicaid programs.  Restricting the Secretary in this way could de-
prive low-income populations of important health-improving pro-
grams and innovations.
This Comment analyzed Stewart I and Stewart II and compli-
cated the understanding of “medical assistance” in light of that
term’s amended definition.  It then analyzed the potential impact of
Stewart I and Stewart II on future SDH-based waivers.  Lastly, it
offered a couple modest examples of the types of SDH-based dem-
onstration projects that should survive judicial scrutiny in light of
Stewart I and Stewart II and the pre- and post-ACA definitions of
“medical assistance.”
212. See Troutman v. Cohen, 661 F. Supp. 802, 812 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (finding
that the state’s regulations impermissibly denied Medicaid recipients access to
skilled nursing services); Services: Individual Representation, PA. HEALTH L. PRO-
JECT, http://bit.ly/2Ebc90u [https://perma.cc/4JBK-5CC6] (last visited Nov. 20,
2019).
213. See Services: Education & Outreach, PA. HEALTH L. PROJECT, http://
bit.ly/2DHxfC7 [https://perma.cc/8K8J-6WZN] (last visited Nov. 20, 2019).
214. See Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Request, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://bit.ly/
2R0QHlM [https://perma.cc/5KEV-JY2J] (last visited Nov. 20, 2019) (listing sev-
eral states’ savings from their civil legal aid programs).
215. See supra notes 209–13 and accompanying text.
